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GATT AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INSTITUTIONS
John H. Jackson*
I. THE URUGUAY ROUND: IMPASSE & GATT IMPACT,
IMPLICATIONS'
As this is written,2 and as we discuss the subject of today's
conference, it is very difficult to predict what will be the out-
come of the Uruguay Round. Launched in September 1986 at a
Punta del Este ministerial meeting, the Uruguay Round is
clearly the most ambitious of the eight negotiating rounds spon-
sored by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
during its forty plus years of history. Perhaps that is the trouble
- the ambition of the agenda has, in the view of some, tended
to weigh down the whole negotiating process.
These negotiations have faced great difficulty. At the
launch, the Punta Declaration manifested great ambition for the
negotiation, with some major new areas to be discussed, includ-
ing trade in services (as vast and important as all the trade in
goods covered by GATT), intellectual property, trade-related in-
vestment measures, and a number of items for strengthening
some of the defects in the current GATT system. The most im-
portant of these latter items was yet another attempt to address
the perplexing problem of trade in agricultural goods, as well as
subsidies and dispute settlement.
Technically, as a matter of law, the GATT applies to trade
in agricultural goods as much as it applies to trade in other
goods; but for a variety of historical reasons, agriculture has
largely escaped the discipline of GATT. The United States, as a
* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Michigan
1. The reader may also be interested in the following works: JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT Sys-
TEM (1990) [hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING]; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRAD-
ING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989) [hereinafter
JACKSON, LAW AND POLICY]; JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES:
A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK (1988); JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY,
ECONOMIC RELATIONS]; JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE].
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major agricultural exporting nation, found this particularly
troublesome, and tried in both the Kennedy Round (1962-1965)
and the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) to readdress the matter and
establish significant GATT discipline over the agricultural sec-
tor. In these endeavors the United States (and other similarly
minded nations) failed. Thus once again in the Uruguay Round,
the United States made it a high priority matter to bring "agri-
culture into the GATT." It also, along with many other coun-
tries, is struggling to develop the new rules for trade in services,
intellectual property, etc.
Much progress has been made on many of the twenty five to
thirty major issues being negotiated in the Uruguay Round, but
as of November 1991 very little progress has been made in the
agricultural sector. The original timetable for the Uruguay
Round was to see final negotiations occurring in the latter half
of 1990, and culminating in a ministerial meeting in Brussels in
December of 1990. This ministerial meeting occurred, but ended
in failure, largely because of the agricultural question. It is on
this issue that the European Community (EC) role has been cru-
cial. The EC leaders seem to recognize that the EC agricultural
policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, must be reformed for
its own good. Many other members of GATT feel that the re-
form is essential to their own trade, and this has been particu-
larly true of the so-called Cairns group of agricultural exporting
countries. The United States pushed hard, but the EC resisted
just as hard, and thus the talks broke down at the end of 1990.3
It might be thought that agriculture once again could be
sidestepped, or put on the table, so that the rest of the vast
agenda of the negotiations might result in a decent or even sub-
stantial culmination of the Round. Indeed, some may hope that
will still happen. However, there is an intricate connection be-
tween the agricultural subject and many of the other important
subjects of the negotiation that makes that very difficult.
First, from the point of view of the United States executive
branch negotiators, it is hard once again to go back to Congress
with a package that does not seriously address the agricultural
3. See generally News Highlights: GATT, USTR Hills Says Chances of Success in
Uruguay Round Impossible to Predict, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Dec. 19, 1990, at 1912;
General Developments: GATT: U.S. Lacked 'Diplomatic Competence' at GATT Talks,
French Minister Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Jan. 2, 1991, at 23; News Highlights:
GATT: U.S., Others Blame EC For Failure in Brussels to Agree on New Rules to Gov-
ern World Trade, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Dec. 12, 1990, at 1876.
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problem in GATT. Second, the United States (as well as other
industrial countries) avidly wants substantial negotiating results
in the areas of trade in services and intellectual property. It has
achieved considerable success in the negotiation of a draft text
on these subjects (more so for intellectual property than ser-
vices, the latter being so complicated). However, for many of the
developing countries, these two new subjects do not offer much
in the form of concrete "payoffs" from the negotiation; and yet
their participation is key to adequate results on these topics. In-
deed, the developing countries are often the "payers" in these
matters rather than the beneficiaries. Still, many of the coun-
tries are prepared to take on substantial obligations if they
would feel compensated by reciprocal advantages drawn from a
substantial achievement in agriculture (as well as textiles and a
few other areas). It is here that agriculture has been something
of the "linchpin" of the whole negotiation, and thus some feel
that without a substantial result in agriculture, it will be impos-
sible to achieve worthwhile results in services and intellectual
property, and therefore the round will fail. At that point, trading
nation administrations (particularly the United States) worry
whether they would be able to obtain legislative approval of the
Round results.
Thus, the general perception in the fall of 1991 is that the
Uruguay Round was held hostage to the approach of the EC,
which in turn is discussing extensive reforms of its agricultural
policy, but on a schedule that will not easily accommodate the
Uruguay Round time table (which is deeply constrained by the
United States statutory "Fast Track").4
On the other hand, a great deal of worthwhile work has al-
4. See generally General Developments: GATT: Uruguay Round Can Be Con-
cluded in Five Months, EC Negotiator Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Oct. 2, 1991, at
1445; General Developments: GATT: Talks Will Reach Decisive Phase in October and
November, Dinkel Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), July 31, 1991, at 1148; JACKSON & DA-
VEY, ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 151-55; News Highlights: Mexico: Senate
and House Vote to Extend Fast Track for North American FTA, Uruguay Round
Talks, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), May 29, 1991, at 802; Keith M. Rockwell, Europe View:
Time For Delors to Take A Stand, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, May 21, 1991; Richard Law-
rence, EC Standing Firm on Farm Trade Offer, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, May 6, 1991, at
4A; David Gardener, A Slimmer Cow, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at 14; News Highlights:
USTR Hills Opposes Setting New Deadline in GATT Talks Until EC Moves On Agri-
culture, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), April 24, 1991, at 600; JOHN H. JACKSON, MITSUO MAT-
SUSHITA & JEAN-VICTOR LouIs, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITU-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 148-150, 162-268 (1984); United States Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487; JACKSON, LAW AND POLICY, supra note 1, at 73-74.
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ready been accomplished in the Uruguay Round. The list of
agreements prepared (as specified in the documents for the
Brussels ministerial meeting) is extensive5 and although many
are extensively "bracketed" to show lack of agreement, others
are nearly ready for final approval. It would be very unfortunate
if all or much of this able work product were abandoned.
Thus it may be worthwhile for governments to reconsider
the negotiating strategy which places so much emphasis on the
relatively intractable subject of agriculture. The Uruguay Round
negotiators are at this moment working in Geneva to try to
break the agriculture impasse, and of course if they succeed that
would be a great step forward. However, the EC has very strong
internal problems with the Uruguay Round timetable, even
though it seems increasingly clear that the EC will have to "re-
form agriculture" within some near period anyway. Thus an ar-
gument can be made that the negotiators should do as much as
is feasible in the near term to maximize a result in agriculture.
At the same time, they should accept the reality of what can be
obtained in agriculture at that time, and "close out" the Uru-
guay Round before it causes more hemorrhage to the GATT (as
a rule and coordination system that has been increasingly suc-
cessful in constraining protectionist national constituencies from
action that would greatly damage world trade). This will require
adjusting aspirations regarding the other subjects of the Uru-
guay Round, but even after such adjustment the Uruguay
Round is very likely to have a result larger than any previous
GATT round, and that certainly can be characterized as a suc-
cess. In addition, it is possible for the negotiators to structure a
continued attention to the agriculture problem, linked to the in-
ternal efforts of the EC to reform agriculture, so that over a few
more years we could see many aspects of the original Uruguay
Round goals achieved. It would be ironic if the Uruguay Round
were to fail now, only to find that in a few years the EC had
finally managed the internal political will to achieve much of the
Uruguay Round agricultural aspirations.
My topic today, however, is focused more on the institu-
tional questions of the GATT trading system. The views I have
just expressed about the Uruguay Round are an important part
of the background of the institutional questions. Indeed, as I im-
5. DRAFT FINAL ACT Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNC/N/35 (26 November 1990).
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plied before, the role of the GATT system to provide a stable,
rule-based system for international trade is perhaps its most im-
portant attribute. Part of my concern about the Uruguay Round
Brussels impasse is the effect that it will have on the ability of
the GATT system to continue and to enhance that role.
Whatever the outcome of the Uruguay Round, and the insti-
tutional developments of GATT, it is clear that the task ahead
for the GATT system is formidable. The accelerating interna-
tional economic interdependence is putting great strain on the
international institutions designed to provide the conditions for
world welfare enhancement through trade and other exchanges
among nations; and to prevent economic tensions from causing
outbursts of violence or worse. The post World War II economic
system (often termed the Bretton Woods system) no longer
seems capable of efficiently managing world economic relations
in a way to promote these two goals - enhancing world welfare
and keeping the peace. Thus, attention to the institutional
problems of GATT (and the other world organizations with eco-
nomic responsibilities) is critically important. It is that subject
that I wish to address.
II. INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
A. GATT - An Institution Suffering From Birth Defects6
The GATT is often described as the major international
treaty discipline for world trade, and the most important inter-
national organization regarding that trade. Yet, paradoxically,
the GATT treaty as such has never come into force, and that
treaty was not originally intended to create an international or-
ganization. Obviously these paradoxical statements need some
explanation. High government officials even today sometimes
say that the GATT is not a "binding" treaty obligation, because
of its strange origins. This statement is not accurate, but the
complexity of the GATT and its historical origins lend them-
selves to such misunderstanding.
In order to fully understand the origins of the GATT, we
must go back to the period at the end of World War II. 7 In 1944
the Bretton Woods Conference was held in the United States,
6. See generally JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING; supra note 1; JACKSON, WORLD TRADE,
supra note 1; JACKSON, LAW AND POLICY, supra note 1.
7. For a more detailed account of this history, see JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra
note 1, at 35-57; see also JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 1, at 9-17.
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for the purpose of drafting the charters of the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This conference did
not directly address the problem of regulation of trade, because
that was deemed to be under the competence of different minis-
tries, but it was recognized that the post World War II economic
system would need a trade organization comparable to the IMF
and the World Bank.
Thus, it was when the United Nations was formed, one of
its first tasks was to launch the preparatory negotiations for a
charter of a potential International Trade Organization (ITO).
These negotiations continued from 1946 through the Havana
meeting in 1948, and resulted in a draft charter.' Simultane-
ously, major nations of the world organized a multilateral nego-
tiation for the reduction of tariffs (pursuing a line of policy be-
gun in the United States, by the 1934 reciprocal trade
agreements act), and as a result of this strand of the negotiation,
the GATT was completed at the Geneva meetings in 1947. The
negotiators for these efforts were largely the same individuals,
meeting at virtually the same time. The original vision was that
the GATT would be merely a tariff reduction multilateral treaty,
and could not be an international organization.9 One of the rea-
sons for this is that the GATT was, from the point of view of the
United States, negotiated pursuant to authority delegated by
statute to the President which authorized a tariff reduction
agreement, but not entry into an organization. 10 On the other
hand, it was understood that the ITO Charter would have to be
submitted to Congress for approval in order for the United
States to enter it as an organization. Since delegates in 1947
wished to bring the GATT into force as quickly as possible, even
though the ITO Charter was not yet completed, it was decided
8. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, at § 2.3.
9. John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 270 (1967) [hereinafter Jackson, General Agree-
ment]. It was recognized that certain administrative functions (e.g., arrangements for
consulting on tariff negotiations) would have to be performed by the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but it was hoped that the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO) would eventually assume these functions. Id.
10. An Act to Extend the Authority of the President Under § 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 and for Other Purposes, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 59 Stat. 410, (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1366 (1945)). While the Tariff Act of 1930 contains no specific
authorization for the President to enter into an organization, there is a substantial argu-
ment supporting such authorization under the statute. Jackson, General Agreement,
supra note 9, at 273.
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to enter into a "Protocol of Provisional Application."'" This
brought the GATT into force on January 1, 1948, with some ex-
ceptions for certain types of existing legislation, in the nations
accepting the protocol. 2 The thought was that after the ITO
Charter was completed, both the GATT and the ITO could be
submitted to various parliaments around the world as necessary,
and adopted as a package with the ITO forming the organiza-
tional structure, and the GATT being merely one among possi-
bly several subsidiary specialized agreements.
After the ITO Charter was completed in 1948, it was sub-
mitted to the United States Congress, but within several years it
was clear that the United States Congress would not approve it
and that the ITO Charter was dead, leaving the GATT to fill the
vacuum that then existed in the overall international economic
relation structure of post World War II (often called the Bretton
Woods System).
Thus, the GATT treaty itself has never come definitively
into force although it is applied as a matter of binding legal obli-
gation through the Protocol of Provisional Application - over
forty years of provisional application! In addition, although the
GATT was not intended to be an international organization, as
time went on the GATT Contracting Parties found it necessary
to introduce through practice, and trial and error, a series of in-
stitutional measures that would enable them to carry on the re-
quired business of the GATT. Thus, in the late 1950's'3 a "coun-
cil" was organized, and an additional large number of
committees and other sub-bodies of the GATT were structured
to carry on the growingly complex work of the GATT.
Over its forty plus years of existence, the GATT has com-
pleted seven major trade negotiating rounds, and is now in the
midst of the eighth. The GATT has been remarkably successful,
particularly with respect to certain kinds of trade barriers (espe-
cially tariffs on industrial products imported to industrial coun-
tries). But the inexorable evolution and growing interdepen-
dence of international economic affairs has resulted in a host of
new problems and subject matters becoming prominent in their
11. Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt.5 a2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
12. Supra note 7; see also, JACKSON, LAW AND POLICY, supra note 1, at 34-37.
13. The Council was established in the 16th GATT Session (1960). GATT Docs. SR.
16/11, at 160 (1960); w. 16/15 corrigendum 1,2 (1960); see also JACKSON, WORLD TRADE,
supra note 1, at 154-57.
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effect on world economic relations, and the GATT treaty text
often is inadequate to respond to these various new problems.
The GATT has evolved a remarkably elaborate system of
"dispute settlement procedures," based on very brief clauses in
the GATT treaty itself. However, the procedures have been con-
siderably embellished through the procedure of relying increas-
ingly on third party "panels" to make legal and factual determi-
nations, which are then submitted to the "Council" for approval.
This dispute settlement system is probably the most extensive
of any major broad-based international dispute settlement sys-
tem that the world has known, dealing with far more countries
and far more cases than, for example, the World Court or any
other broadly based multilateral international tribunal.
Despite all these relative successes, the GATT rests on a
very unfirm institutional base. Partly because of the difficulty of
amending the GATT, and partly because of the need for evolu-
tion and at least agreement among subgroups of contracting par-
ties to the GATT for the establishment of new rules, the GATT
system has become an intricate web of more than 200 separate
treaty instruments. I have detailed many of these problems of
GATT elsewhere, 14 so I will only briefly outline some of the in-
stitutional problems found in the GATT system, to illustrate
and provide examples of the broader proposition of the need for
institutional reform of the GATT.
1) The "provisional" application of GATT has been very
confusing to the public and experts alike. It has also involved
the so-called "grandfather rights" of existing legislation, which
have been the subject of the rankest debate.
2) The amending provisions of the GATT treaty structure
are inadequate. It is very difficult to amend the GATT (unanim-
ity for some clauses; two-thirds for other clauses), and even
when amended, the amendments do not apply to countries that
refuse to accept the amendment. Many people have felt that the
GATT is impossible to amend, and one result of this feeling in
the Tokyo Round of the 1970's, was the establishment of a series
of separate treaty "side agreements," or "codes" which added
greatly to the complexity of GATT. This rendered the GATT
vulnerable to the charge that it was an "a la carte" system,
which reduced the predictability and uniformity of obligations
14. See JACKSON, LAW AND POLICY, supra note 1, at 27-58; see also JACKSON, RE-
STRUCTURING, supra note 1, at 45-47.
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among nations.
3) The relationship of some of these side agreements to the
GATT itself, in some cases affected by the most favored nation
clause, has been sometimes murky and difficult to apply.
4) The relationship of the GATT treaty system to domestic
law in a number of GATT member countries, including the
United States, is also a troublesome issue.
5) A number of problems concerning membership, or con-
tracting party status in the GATT system exist. There are vari-
ous ways by which a nation or an independent customs territory
can become a GATT contracting party, but there are additional
troublesome clauses in GATT, such as the opt out clause of Arti-
cle XXXV by which some contracting parties can opt out of a
GATT relationship with other parties.
6) The Contracting Parties have been acting jointly much in
the role of an "assembly" comparable to other international or-
ganizations, but the power of the Contracting Parties so acting is
very ambiguous, and could be abused (although it has not so far
been abused). There are a number of unsettled and disquieting
issues such as the power of the Contracting Parties to interpret
the GATT agreement, and the relationship of actions of Con-
tracting Parties to some of the side agreements. It is also very
hard to develop a new rule-making process.
7) The dispute settlement processes of GATT have been
among the more intriguing and, at least recently, successful ex-
periences of that institution. But there are still some very im-
portant problems, including the situation by which a losing
party can block acceptance by the Council of a panel report, and
the lack of a unified procedure. More attention to this procedure
is obviously needed, and to ambiguous GATT phrases such as
"nullification or impairment."
8) There has long been a problem with respect to the rela-
tionship of GATT to the other Bretton Woods institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The
GATT has often been treated as a "country cousin," inferior to
the other institutions, and there have sometimes developed cer-
tain contradictory policies as between these institutions. There
is a feeling that more "coherence" is called for.
B. A Rule-Based System - Rule Oriented Diplomacy and the
GATT
Economists, diplomats, businessmen, and others, have com-
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mented on the desirability of a "rule-based system" for structur-
ing international economic relations. Particularly when applied
to market-oriented systems with their characteristically decen-
tralized decision-making (millions of entrepreneurs), it can be
argued that some sort of rule orientation of society's structure is
a very important positive attribute for economic welfare, the
processes of exchange, and the correlative economies of scale
and specialization. For example, an investor in a new plant in a
small cbuntry may realize that for the plant to be efficient it
must produce a quantity of products much larger than that
which can be absorbed by the small country itself, and thus the
plant becomes very dependant upon the ability to export. If
there were no rules to constrain actions of countries, that export
activity might be cut off by arbitrary government actions. The
risk of such an unruly situation would raise the investment re-
turn premium needed by the investor to proceed with the
project.15
In the GATT, there has been a many decades' debate about
the relative merits of a rule-based system as compared to a "ne-
gotiation and diplomacy-based system," the latter sometimes
called "power-based diplomacy." However, as the activities of
world trade in relation to the GATT system have become in-
creasingly complex and influenced by a larger number of treaty
instruments, the trend, at least for the last decade, has been de-
cidedly toward a rule-oriented approach. The GATT dispute
settlement system has been greatly strengthened and improved,
although it still has some important defects, including the block-
ing possibility. One of the important initiatives in the Uruguay
Round has been the desire to strengthen the rule-oriented dis-
pute settlement procedures of the GATT. The major negotiating
countries have made remarkable progress in this regard, coming
to a text that even contemplates an "appellate" process, possibly
to substitute for a council approval procedure which is vulnera-
ble to "blocking."
This initiative is to be applauded, and it is certainly one of
the important elements of a potential completion of the Uru-
guay Round. In some ways, this advance in the rule process
15. See John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations:
A Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979); JACKSON, LAW AND
POLICY, supra note 1, at 85-88; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK
46-47 (1990); JAGDISH BHAGWATI AND HUGH T. PATRICK, AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 4-5
(1990); see generally works cited supra note 1.
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could be significantly more important than many of the substan-
tive agreements which have been hammered out over a half
decade.
There are several other aspects of an improved dispute set-
tlement process in GATT. The existing system is a hodgepodge
of several separate dispute settlement procedures, some of them,
established under the separate treaty codes and side agreements
of GATT. The system cries out for a unified dispute settlement
process to avoid the forum shopping and the competence dis-
putes that are inherent in a fragmented system, as well as to
strengthen the public perception and the careful procedural
evolution of that system. Yet, when one considers the possibility
of a unified dispute settlement process, particularly as it might
also apply to some of the "new issues" of the Uruguay Round
(e.g. services and intellectual property), it immediately forces
consideration of a broader institutional rethinking for the
GATT. A rule-oriented system must have some kind of supervi-
sory mechanism and staff and secretariat support. Is this to be
accomplished solely within the GATT? Or is it to be accom-
plished in the context of a broader framework or umbrella agree-
ment that can shelter and facilitate agreements that might be
concluded on other issues including the new issues of the Uru-
guay Round, and potential other subjects which in the future
will be brought under the "GATT system umbrella?"
Furthermore, although unlikely to be seriously addressed in
this round, and a subject of some fear of governments, there
needs to be attention to the "rule making" procedures. To re-
quire all new rules to be introduced by new treaties, or to re-
quire new rules to be developed only at periodic (decade sepa-
rated) negotiating rounds, simply will not work given the
complexity and pace of international economic affairs. On the
other hand, whatever system for developing new rules and re-
sponses to the speedy changes of economic affairs is contem-
plated, it must give adequate attention to the democratic gov-
ernmental processes of the contracting parties to GATT, and not
simply be the product of governmental or certain economic
elites. There are enormously difficult questions involved in these
issues, including internal struggles of power within certain enti-
ties (such as the European Community, or the United States
Government) which are participants in the GATT.
1992]
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C. Restructuring the GATT System
In a small book commissioned and published by the Chat-
ham House in London (Royal Institute of International Af-
fairs),16 and also published by the Council on Foreign Relations
(New York), I outlined a potential restructuring of the GATT
system institutions. The outline is very modest - it merely sug-
gests that the contracting parties and Uruguay Round negotia-
tors establish by firm and clear treaty, a simple and fairly short
institutional charter for an umbrella organization, to be called
either the Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO), or World
Trade Organization (WTO). This charter, quite unlike the origi-
nal 1948 ITO Charter, would not contain any matters of sub-
stance. It would be devoted entirely to defining an institutional
structure; establishing and reaffirming the treaty base of the
GATT, its status as an international organization (with attend-
ant legal status and necessary privileges and immunities), and,
the necessary staff and other resources to carry out the essential
work of the agreement. In most situations, those ad hoc and
evolved-by-practice "de facto" institutions of the current GATT,
would be absorbed and become the institutional components of
the new MTO. The MTO would supervise the dispute settle-
ment system, and would allow for the possibility of facilitating
and supporting not only the GATT itself (as extensively revised
and reformed over the years and in the Uruguay Round), but
also agreements on important new issues such as services and
intellectual property. But in addition, the umbrella organization
would be open-ended enough so that during the course of future
years and decades, additional agreements could be "hung on the
hooks" of the MTO.
One of the recent innovations within the GATT context has
been the development of a Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM), which is designed to provide a forum for an analytical
look at specific government trade policy practices (somewhat
along the model of the economic reviews in the Organization of
Economic and Cultural Development (OECD)). There is some
thought that this is a useful process for study and deliberation
to enhance the world's understanding of the trade interrelations
among nations, and thus should be broadened to apply to other
activities such as services. A new umbrella organization could
16. See generally JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 1.
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very easily embody a TPRM with such a broadened mandate.
D. Institutional Questions After the Uruguay Round
Even though these simple and quite modest proposals for
institutional restructuring during the Uruguay Round could be a
positive enhancement of the role of the GATT system, after
reinforcing a rule orientation, no one should be thinking that no
further changes will be necessary. There are a number of other
institutional issues that will have to be addressed in future
years, but if the MTO/WTO simple umbrella organization is
well designed, it will enable the nation participants to evolve
other newer structures over time, and to "fine tune" some of the
continuing institutional aggravations of the system.
III. GATT AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
A. Introduction
Whatever the outcome of the Uruguay Round, the GATT
system faces many formidable problems in the near future and
over the next few decades. In the previous part of this paper, I
have focused on the institutional questions of that system. I do
not want to close, however, without at least briefly mentioning a
tentative inventory of some of the substantive issues facing the
GATT. Many of you have noticed the remarkable explosion of
opinion and criticism of the recent GATT panel ruling in the so-
called Dolphin-Tuna case between Mexico and the United
States.17 This is just one example of a number of very perplexing
problems facing the GATT system. Let me catalogue some of
these problems, and then close my comments.
17. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, report submitted August 16,
1991. GATT Doc. DS 21/R (Sept. 3, 1991). In this case, the panel had to determine
whether the ban imposed by the United States on imports of Mexican Tuna under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act was a violation of Articles III and XI of GATT. The
Panel reported that the United States embargo was not related to the product itself but
to the process (in this case, the use of purse seine nets by Mexican fishing vessels leading
to the numerous accidental killings of dolphins). The Panel also rejected the United
States argument according to which the ban would be justified under Article XX(b)
(measures necessary to protect animal life) and XX(g) (measures relating to the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources), considering that these exceptions only apply for
domestic reasons. The United States ban represented an attempt to regulate environ-
mental issues outside its jurisdiction. Finally, the panel argued that changes in GATT to
accommodate environmental concerns should be addressed by the negotiation of GATT
changes or waivers rather than by labored interpretations of the existing agreement. Id.
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B. Post Uruguay Round Issues
For convenience and comprehension, I can group the post
Uruguay Round issues facing the GATT into several categories,
as follows:
Continuation of Uruguay Round Issues:
A number of the issues more or less extensively addressed in
the Uruguay Round will undoubtedly continue to require impor-
tant negotiation and consideration. Agriculture is obvious, and it
is very likely that such subjects as subsidies, antidumping du-
ties, safeguards, textiles, gray area measures and voluntary re-
straint agreements, will be just a few among a longbr list of sub-
jects that will demand further attention.
New Substantive Issues:
There are a group of issues that are more or less new to the
GATT, and will be causing increasing difficulty and demanding
greater attention. A few can be mentioned:
1) Competition. The general area of competition (or anti-
monopoly) policy is one that has been increasingly noticed as a
prime candidate for further attention. The original ITO Charter
contained an elaborate title addressing these issues, but when
the charter failed, this subject largely dropped to the wayside of
international trade policy for the past forty years. It is now be-
coming increasingly apparent that it can no longer be a wayside
matter. The general objectives of facilitating world trade de-
mand attention to the attributes of competition in that trading
system. Monopolies can undo the trade liberalization effect of
reduced tariffs and nontariff barriers.
2) Nonmarket Economies. The GATT has unsuccessfully
struggled with the problem of state trading and nonmarket
economies for many decades. This problem will continue, al-
though in the light of the dramatic developments in East Eu-
rope, and a general world wide trend toward market-oriented, or
"privatized" economies, it may become less severe than had
been contemplated even two or three years ago. China's entry
into GATT could impose great stress on the GATT system.
3) Science, Product Standards, and Harmonization. Prod-
uct development has been accelerated, and products themselves
have become increasingly complex. Thus, standards for products
have become a very important issue for international trade.
When standards are very diverse in a random and unthoughtful
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way, trade is inhibited because economies of scale become much
more difficult. This is the lesson that the European Community
has learned with a vengeance, and it has been proceeding with
considerable vigour in trying to overcome this problem. That
lesson is now becoming a part of the deliberations at the broader
multilateral scale of the GATT system, as some of the specific
cases (such as hormones) have demonstrated full well.
4) Cultural Impacts on the Flow of Trade. We have begun
to realize that trade can be importantly influenced by relatively
subtle cultural, or systemic societal attributes in different coun-
tries. Much attention has been given to Japan in this regard, but
there are similar issues in the other major trading countries, if
not all countries. Canada, the European Community, and the
United States each have a variety of cultural attitudes and socie-
tal institutions that can, in some circumstances, inhibit trade.
Japan and the United States have had a series of discussions
about these issues under the title of Structural Impediments Ini-
tiative (SII). These discussions have clearly demonstrated that
there will be increasing future importance given to cultural im-
pediments to international trade. Clearly, there are a number of
dilemmas of competing but appropriate governmental objectives
imbedded in this subject. No one wants the world to be stamped
into uniformity, and cultural diversity is often a desirable attri-
bute for a variety of reasons including recognition of freedom of
individuals and small groups.
Link Issues:
Another major group of issues facing the post-Uruguay
Round GATT system are what I term the "link issues." These
are issues that involve linking international trade policy to im-
portant alternative considerations and governmental interna-
tional policies, often not traditionally viewed as appropriate for
trade policy. Nevertheless, the world and its citizens are de-
manding linkages, and it is increasingly clear that linkages are
indeed appropriate and must be studied and understood. Exam-
ples include the following:
1) Environmental Protection. Most significantly, there is
the question of environmental protection and trade policy. This
has been raised in several of the GATT panel dispute cases al-
ready, and there has been much discussion about the possibility
that trade policy can influence, for better or worse, potentials for
environmental protection. In the United States Congressional
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debate concerning the Mexico-United States-Canada trade nego-
tiations, these issues came very prominently to the fore.
2) Human Rights. Countries have long exercised the right to
undertake certain trade actions (such as embargoes, or trade
sanctions), for the purpose of influencing the actions and atti-
tudes of foreign governments on human rights. This trend will
undoubtedly continue, and will demand some attention from the
trade policy community with respect to appropriate limits and
criteria in such cases.
3) Arms Control. Governments have long taken actions to
restrain arms races, and to limit the sale abroad of strategic
items deemed potentially dangerous to national security. The
GATT has a few clauses that arguably address this question, but
there has been much ambiguity about many actions, including
various kinds of export controls, in their relationship to the
GATT. The Gulf War demonstrated poignantly the importance
of these issues, and there is no way that the GATT will be able
to escape them.
4) Relation to Monetary Policy and "Coherence." This has
been mentioned above, but needs to be included in any list of
"link issues."
Rethinking Traditional Rules:
A final category of post Uruguay Round issues for the
GATT system, I label "rethinking traditional GATT policies."
There are a series of general policies/concepts/rules in the
GATT that are considered by many to be central to the whole
GATT structure, and yet have caused considerable problems to
the more complex and rapidly changing questions of interna-
tional trade policy. It will be necessary to rethink some of these
old concepts, even though many practitioners already have man-
ifested a resistance to such rethinking because they fear en-
croachments on some of the basic pillars of a GATT system. The
following illustrate some of these issues:
1) MFN - Most Favored Nation Treatment. The MFN
clause has often been considered the central rule of the GATT
system, and yet when the system includes a very large number
of countries such as more than 100 now participating in the
GATT, MFN may make it difficult to develop new rules, and
affords a particular privilege to the "free rider.""
18. See John H. Jackson, Equality and Discrimination in International Economic
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2) Reciprocity. Reciprocity has been a central driving prin-
ciple in many of the GATT negotiations. It worked better when
negotiations centered on tariffs, and countries could be seen to
"swap" concessions, which then made it easier for governments
to "sell the resulting agreement" to their home constituencies.
However, as the issues have moved away from tariffs and toward
nontariff barriers, with the resulting complex needs for rule
structures, reciprocity often becomes relatively meaningless. In-
stead, there needs to be an emphasis on the policy of the rules,
and presumably virtually all countries will benefit over time if
those rules are applied effectively. In any event, it becomes vir-
tually impossible at the time the rule is made to be able to pre-
dict with much accuracy which particular countries will be fa-
vored, and which not.
3) National Treatment. Another "nondiscrimination" prin-
ciple of GATT that is quite central to that system is the na-
tional treatment rules (particularly Article III of GATT). These
rules are basically structured to require nondiscrimination as be-
tween imported goods and domestically produced goods, but
they do not particularly require any minimum standard of ra-
tionality, or scientific support. Thus, a government can argue
that its foolish measure is perfectly appropriate if it applies it
equally to the imported goods, as well as its domestic goods. We
have already seen several cases, especially in the agriculture and
product standards area (so-called phytosanitary rules) where
negotiators do not feel that the existing GATT approach is ade-
quate. There must be instead, it is argued, some requirement
that governments show a rationale for the rules and product af-
fecting regulations that they adopt.
4) Regionalism. The problem of the relationship of regional
preferential arrangements (such as the European Community, or
the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement) to the GATT,
has been a sore point in the GATT from its beginning. Clearly
the original GATT contemplates some measure of deference to
groups of nations who wish to bind together in a trading ar-
rangement that can provide for a deeper measure of liberaliza-
tion of the trade in goods, services or other matters. How that
can be done while giving some recognition to the GATT MFN
Law (XI): The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 37 BRIT. Y.B. WORLD AFF. 224
(1983); JACKSON, LAW AND POLICY, supra note 1, at 133-48; see also works cited supra
note 1.
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clause (nondiscrimination), is the troublesome point. The GATT
rules (Article XXIV) have been utilized but are thought by
many, including authors of some penetrating economic and
scholarly works, to be inadequate. As we seem to be moving into
a world with even greater importance given to regional trading
arrangements (the European Community expanding and deep-
ening its relationship; the North American continent developing
a new North American Free Trade Agreement; potentially a Pa-
cific Basin arrangement, etc.), clearly the GATT will have to
face the issue of the relationship of these blocks to the broader
multilateral system, and the GATT should play a "traffic cop"
role in preventing these blocks from damaging each other.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
My conclusions for this work can be rather simply stated.
They are that governments need to pay as much attention to the
institutional structure of the GATT system, as they pay to the
substantive measures in the GATT. This institutional structure
will have a very important influence on whether the GATT will
be able to play its important and constructive role on the near
and farther future of international economic relations. The im-
portance of a rule oriented system can be quite easily estab-
lished - indeed, all successful domestic economic systems rely
very heavily on a rule-oriented system more easily put in place
by sovereign national governments with a certain monopoly on
power. At the international level, there is no such monopoly on
power, and it becomes much more difficult to establish an effec-
tive and efficient rule-oriented system, particularly in the face of
the attitudes of a number of governments, including attitudes
that still give unmerited weight to the historical notion of sover-
eign independence and equality of states.
Having said this, however, we must recognize that the
GATT and international economic relations are only part of a
much broader and more profound world structure. The events of
the last three or four years have resulted in an extraordinary
shift of international relationships. Many have commented that
the "Cold War is over, and the West has won." In any event, the
old bi-polar world seems to have almost evaporated. The Gulf
War demonstrated certain elements of that, as well as for the
first time reinvigorating the United Nations as part of the inter-
national institutional structure for pursuing the general goals
desired so much by the world's peoples. But where will the fu-
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ture lead? Is the United States to be now the new hegemon? Or
will the United States public turn inward in a parochial and iso-
lationist tendency to preserve its own well being, even if at the
cost of longer term world peace and security, as well as the cost
of poverty and economic tensions elsewhere in the world?
The GATT system cannot be isolated from these general
trends. It must be institutionally enhanced so it can play a
stronger and more effective role in this very important part of
the world relations endeavors. But the GATT will also have to
recognize the relationships and ties with many of the other
world problems and concerns, some of which have been outlined
under the catalog of new issues in the previous section.
Let us hope that the GATT can rise to this task, and that
the Uruguay Round will be sufficiently successful to help it per-
form this role, and not flounder under the cloud of pessimism
and declining prestige, which has effectively oppressed the
GATT since the Brussels December 1990 impasse.
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